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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

CECIL WOODARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

!
!
)

W. BRENT JENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent ,
and Third-Party
Plaintiff-Respondentf
vs.

)
I
I

RICHARD SEVERIN and
MRS. RICHARD SEVERIN,

I>

Third-Party DefendantsRespondents.

SUPREME COURT NO. 870346

!

BRIEF OF THIRD - PA RT Y DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS SEVERIN
JURISJ^ICTJJ)N
This Court granted Appellant Woodard's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, appealing the Utah Court of Appeals' decision affirming
a Third District Court decision.

In the Third Judicial District

Court, Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding, judgment was
granted in favor of Appellant against Respondent Jensen for damages.
Judgment was also granted in favor of Respondent Severin against
Appellant Woodard quieting title to certain property in Summit
County.
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ISSUE
The issue presented for review is: Who has superior title to
the subject property—Woodard or Severin?

STATJ^MENT_ OF_TJ^E_CA_SE
This is a quiet title action.

To overcome Severin1s superior

titlef Woodard is asking the Court to reform a 1972 Option
Agreement on real property and then grant specific performance
thereon.
1.

The facts of the case are as follows:
In 1972, Woodard met with a developer, W. Brent Jensen, to

discuss the purchase by Woodard of five acres of mountain property
in Summit County, owned by Jensen, as a cabin site.

They agreed on

a parcel and marked a corner with a pile of rocks. (R. 288.)
2.

On September 21, 1972, Woodard and Jensen executed a

written agreement, agreeing to give Woodard an option to the
property, subject to a plat being recorded with Summit County
allowing for subdivision into five acre lots. (Exhibit 19-P.) The
Agreement is included herein as Ex. A of the Appendix.
3.

The agreement contained an erroneous legal description:

It used as its beginning point the southwest corner of Section 28,
rather than the west quarter corner. (Exhibit 19-P, R. 268, 270-72,
423, 476-77.)
4.

In August of 1973,

before Jensen had recorded the

property in conformance with the Agreement, Woodard commenced
construction of a cabin on the "intended" property. (R. 293.)
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5.

Summit County would not approve the Jensen plat for five

acre lots because there was not a central water system within
several thousand feet of the property. (R. 374, 367-67, 377-78,
400-01.)
6.

Jensen explained to Woodard that he would not be able to

sell the property as a five acre lot as recited in the agreement.
(R. 379f 415-16.)
7.

Woodard*s response was to record with Summit County the

1972 Agreement—which described property one-half mile south of the
"intended" property—and file this lawsuit against Jensen seeking
specific performance. (R. 289, 449, Exhibit 19-P.)
8.

Woodard stopped work on his cabin in 1975.

completed and has not been worked on since 1975.
9.

It was not

(R.306-07.)

On August 20, 1973f Severin purchased from Jensen prop-

erty adjacent to the "intended" Woodard property. (Exhibit 1-D.)
10.

Severin commenced construction of a summer home in

August, 1973, on the property conveyed to him by Jensen, and
finished it the same year, with an addition added in 1981. (R. 441,
446.)
11.

Various deeds in 1974, 1976 and 1977 from Security Title,

acting as trustee for Brent Jensen, conveyed additional adjacent
property to Severin, including the "intended" Woodard property.
(Exhibits 2-D, 3-D, 4-D, 5-D, 6-D.)
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12.

Severin was added as a third party defendant in 1979.

(R.69.)
13.

In October of 1980f Woodard filed a Third Amended

Complaint alleging for the first time mutual mistake in the legal
description in the 1972 Option Agreement, and offering for the
first time a substituted legal description of the property, which
is at considerable variance to the description written in the 1972
Agreement, even allowing for the mistake.

(R.107-111.)

The two

descriptions are drawn below:

\

A. Intended Description
B. Description in 3rd
Amended Complaint

14.

Because of the numerous legal descriptions involved, a

large chart with overlays was submitted to the Court as Exhibit
18-D, but has not been transmitted to the Supreme Court because of
its size.

For the sake of clarity, counsel has attempted to

reconstruct Exhibit 18-D on the following page showing the various
legal descriptions.
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N.W. L/4, SECTION' 28
T.l N. R.4 E. S.L.B.§ M.

N
N

Deed No. 4
\
-*£!.

^ Best. S
\

Woodard ca&j.n

V

H

^ .

\^ Dest. B

L

Deed No. 3

-V
^

^
Severin
cabin

Deed No. 1

Deed Nd. 2

IVest 1/4 corner Section 28

\

Explanation
Description A
Description B
Description C
Deed No. 1
Deed No. 2
Deed No. 3
Deed No. 4
Deed No. 5

1972 Agreement
Intended Location
3rd Amended Complaint
Severin 8/20/73
(Exhibit 1-D)
Severin 11/22/74
(Exhibit 2-D)
Severin 7/30/76
(Exhibit 5-D)
Severin 12/27/77
(Exhibit 35-D)
Sale by Severin to
3rd parties 11/23/77
(Exhibit 6-D)

SUJI^RY^JDF^^RGUME^NT
In a quiet title action, one must prevail on the merits of
his own title, and Severin has a superior title to Woodard.
Even allowing Woodard to reform the legal description in his
Agreement of 1972, does not change the fact that the Agreement is
an agreement to give an option subject to a condition subsequent;
the condition subsequent never occurred; and title to the land
never passed to Woodard.
^GUMENT
I
REFORMING THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT GIVE
WOODARD SUPERIOR TITLE TO SEVERIN
The essence of Woodard's brief is that he asks for reformation
of the Agreement to correct the legal description, on the basis of
mutual mistake, and then is asking for specific performance of that
Agreement.
There is no dispute, and never has been, that the legal
description contained in the 1972 Agreement between Jensen and
Woodard is erroneous.

The error was that description was tied to

the southwest corner, rather than the west quarter corner of
section 28.

It describes property one-half mile to the south of

the property contemplated by Jensen and Woodard.

(R. 268, 270-272,

423, 476-77.)
But once the legal description is corrected, what does Woodard
have?
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The Agreement states in pertinent part:

This agreement made and entered into this 21st day of
September, 1972, by and between W. BRENT JENSEN,
hereinafter referred to as Seller and CECIL WOODARD,
hereinafter referred to as buyer. Now, therefore, it is
hereby agreed between the parties as follows:
1. It is agreed that the seller is desirous of selling
and the buyer is desirous of buying a parcel of ground
more specifically described as
(A metes and bounds legal description is written
in by hand.)
The seller also agrees that this parcel of land will be a
minimum of 5 acres.
2. It is understood that Lot 1 is in the process of
being made ready for recording with Summit County, Utah
and cannot be sold at this time. However, seller agrees
that when Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer has first right
and option to purchase Lot No. 1.
3. Until that time buyer agrees to buy part of Forest
Meadow Ranch Plat C Lot #69, more specifically desribed
as
(Legal description typed in.)
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2. At the time Lot
No. 1 is recorded the buyer will release the right and
interest in Lot No. 2, and will exercise his option on
Lot No. 1.
* * *

7. The Seller hereby agrees to furnish to buyer Title
Insurance to the property no later than October 1, 1974.
* * *

(Emphasis added.)
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(1)
AGREEMENT IS NOT A "LAND PURCHASE AGREEMENT."
First of allf the Agreement is not a "land purchase
agreements as appellant is so wont to call it.
p. lf 1[#2f and entire Argument on pages 6-9.)

(Appellant's Brief,

Correcting the legal

description does not "reform" the above Agreement into a conveyance
of title.
Appellant's brief cites a plethora of cases for the proposition that specific performance of a contract to sell land is a
well recognized remedy in equity.

(Brief pp. 6-9.)

All parties to

this lawsuit recognize that principle of law as being sound.
The difference in this case is that appellant does not have a
land sale contract.
important.

Paragraph No. 2 of the Agreement is all

It states:

2. It is understood that Lot 1 is in the process of
being made ready for recording with Summit County, Utah
and cannot be sold at this time. However, seller agrees
that when Lot No. 1 is recorded the buyer has first right
and option to purchase Lot No. 1.
Appellant has even acknowledged that the 1972 Agreement does
not convey title.

In Answers to Request for Admissions appellant

stated:
REQUEST NO. 2: Do you admit that no written document
was ever drafted conveying title to you of the property
described in your Third Amended Complaint, paragraph 8?
ANSWER:

Yes.

(R. 190.)
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Appellant is asking this Court to reform the 1 972 Agreement
based upon t h e m i s t a k e i n t h e J e g a 1 d e s c r i p t i o n , I: • i I t ;i : e f : • r
1 e g a J d e s c r i p t i o :i: :t d c e s i I c t 11 :t r i: i t h e I \ g r e e m e n t i n t c a c o n v e y a :u tr o f
tit] e,

The Agreement was never inte-ned to ronvey title and

Woodard acknowledges that

THIHI)

HI

oy M M e .

i '»I

LOT 1 COULD NOT BE RECORDED AS A FIVE ACRE PARCEL
T h e A g r e e m e n t r;\,»eci f i ca ] ] j states 11: Iat llSe-I ] er agrees 11: iat
when 1,.0'L No

I is recorded the Buyer has first right and sption to
Defendant Jensen t e s t i f y 1 ^'

r>u ;hase L<

v

lal

that

County would nut allow the recording of five acre subdivision "ots
when a centra,! water systern was not available to the proper ty.
! "

.1

Recording

!•! ,

ot

i "I I

»

t h e pi oper t.\

d i v i s i o n war. a c o n d i t i o !
ocvu i i: hMl

,111 I

-

•

as a five

Ag r e eme n t ,
Absent

q i v e Woodard a " f i i: s t
the

pei: I; o n m a n c e of

aci:e

m e Agrerrnpnt ,

i n J diii a l e s u i t . J e n s e n

could

i'ii-t,r

1 ot

w i t h i n a su11• •

riv" .'or I n I-HI i n v i ' i
Uf

ienns

of

t: Li-,

r i g h t a 11d opt: i on " t, o 1 iOt

recordii'iq Willi .'liiiiniiil
I. he Agr e e m e n t .

•

i'l'iunl,1,

|PM:'I,

L972
No .

I I, k , ,-,p^M.: J L H

BLT^^Inv^.^^Co^^j^^^Sjic^w,

586 P. 2d

I.

e

456 (1978).

As the Court of Appeals in this matter said:

Recording was clearly a condition precedent to Jensen's duty
to offer a first right and option to purchase the property
under the Agreement. As the condition precedent of the Agreement has not been fulfilledf the equitable remedies of
reformation and specific performance of the Agreement are not
available to Woodard. (62 U.Adv.Rpt. 29)
(3)
THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION SUED UPON DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE
LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF THE 1972 AGREEMENT
Even reforming the legal description contained in the 1972
Agreementf to tie the description to the west quarter corner,
rather than the southwest corner, does not account for the fact
that appellant has sued for property having a legal description
which has no similarity to the description contained in the 1972
Agreement.
The legal description in the 1972 Agreement is:
Beginning at a point
the S*W. corner sec.
N 61°30' E, 670 ft.;
665 ft.; S 76 30 ' W,

North, 680 ft. and East, 520 ft. from
28, TIN, R4E, SLB&M and running thence
N 30 00 • W, 330 ft.; S. 61 20'W,
130 ft. to the point of beginning.

The description in paragraph 8 of plaintiff's Third Amended
Complaint is:
Beginning at a point which is North 0 S'll" West 1268.458
feet and East 634.54 feet from the West quarter corner of
Section 28, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence North 87°3f56" East 733.74 feet;
thence South 4°12llfl West 318.98 feet; thence South
85°10fl" West 600.00 feet; thence North 18°27f12" West
349.40 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 5.0
acres.
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!"n a n s w e r s to I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s a p p e l l a n t w a s asked w h y there
J isc i e par icy i n I h ," I * .J.I I
A g r e e m e n t and the Third A m e n d e c C o m p . a i :

•

--

. :jar.or.- and

A n s w e r s a r e as f:o11ows":
G A T O R Y NO. 1: On what basis are you claiming an
interest in the property described in your Third Amended
Complant, pa ragraph 8 ?
INTERRO

ANSWER: Agreement betweei I W • Brent J ensen and
plaintiff dated September 21, 1972. Performance of said
Agreement and designation on the ground by the seller of
the land to be described in the Agreement.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Who made the survey describing
the property in your Third Amended Complaint, paragraph 8?
ANSWER:

Apposian Consulting Engineers, Inc.

E
ANSWER:

survey completed?
About loui y<":: •

(Answered Janudiv

. ;~.)

* rpquestf ; . , _;vey be made?
ANSWER:

Plaintiff.

INTERROGATORY NO , 4: Whj are you ci aiming interest in
the property described in your Third Amended Complaint
instead of the property described in your Agreement with
Brent Jensen dated September 21 r 1972?
ANSWER: The property described in the Third Amended
Complaint was intended by both parties to be covered by
the Agreement dated December (si c) 21, 197 2, The property
described in the Agreement was incorrectly described and
covers land some distance away. (R. 193-194.)
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Appellant's lawsuit is asking for property which was not
intended by the parties. (R. 367-68.)

The property intended

by

the parties is identified in the 1972 Agreement, but should be ti
to the west quarter corner, rather than the southwest corner of
Section 28.

Appellant should not be allowed to arbitrarily

determine any five acres he so choosesf and certainly this five
acres was not contemplated in the 1972 Agreement.

(R. 367-68.)

(4)
APPELLANT ACKNOWLEDGES HE NEVER RECEIVED TITLE
At trial, Woodard testified he never received title to the
property:
Q. You were describing to us your cabin in the latter
part of your testimony. Now, it's true, is it not, your
cabin has been built in stages? Isn't that so?
A. Well, I did not complete it totally, and the reason
I did not, I had not secured title. (R.315.)
* * *

Q. Why did you build the cabin in 1973 on property
that you didn't have title to?
A. Well, I had an Agreement I was going to get title
to it.
Q. But you admit you did not have title to it at the
time you commenced construction?
A.

Oh, I knew that.

I knew I didn't have title.

Q.

When did you obtain title?
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A „ I have not obtained title yet.
here. (R 3 28,)

That's why w e 1 r e

(Emphasis added.)
D)

APPELLANT'S REMEDY IS DAMAGES
Specific performance connotes "performance specifica ] ly as
a q ie e d. "

I! 1111

e nt 1: Ia s i i• :: j: i: o v i s :i :::: • i I t • :: spe < .

convey title r there can be no specific performance,' as prayed - oAppel lant 1 s remedy then, is for damages.

h'V A p p e l J ant her ei n
Appei I .',n;il J i Cumplduil

makes a eJ ai m for damages "' d.-,. un all M MH I, i ve r

if,, fin any reason, a decree cannot be ei itered as prayed "" ' The
Tr

j_a2 c o u r t awarded appe] ] ant damages.

II.
TITjjji SHOULD BE QUIETED T O SEVERIN
BASED UPON THE STRENGTH OF S E V E R I N 1 S TITLE.

* e
cannc

. .t . .
rrength

i

weakness

>r • i

'i^ r j_ Xj*__?ta_te, " ' .

.

:.* i . e : ^ : , .

~9.L®IE§D

:.. i

*':

;^"!

v

.-

•. _EJut^l^oyJL<2h, S ; w F

<\sn n

>..•

*

—at

stated:

An action to qui et title is an action at law where the
pleadings put in issue the ownership and possession of
real property. In such an action, the plaintiff must
succeed by virtue of the strength of his own title rathei:
than the weakness of defendant's ti11e; neverthe1ess a11
the plaintiff need do is to prove prima facie that he has
title f which if not overcome by defendant, is sufficient.

14-

Since this is an action at law, upon reviewf the findings
and judgment of the trial court will be presumed valid,
and the record will be reviewed in a light favorable to
them. The appellant is required to sustain the burden of
proving error, and the judgment of the trial court will
not be disturbed if there be substantial evidence in the
record to support it. (At 1376.)
And to prove prima facie title this Court, in ^sic^^Servj^e
Corpc>raW^n_y^JWalt(yif 20 Utah 2d 16, 434 P. 2d 334 (1967)
reaffirmed the language in Cottj^elJ^j^

32 Utah 62, 88 P.

696 (1907) , which indicates what a party must do in quiet title
actions to prove title:
* * * Of course, where one proves a perfect chain of paper
title from its original source, no proof of actual
possession at all is required. In such event the
presumption would be all sufficient and the title would be
a complete and perfect title. But, when this is not done,
a title prima facie is shown by a grant from some one who
held possession, or by such grant and possession under it
by the grantee. As against a mere technical objection by
anyone who, at the time the objection is made, appears to
be a mere stranger to the title, such a prima facie title
would seem quite sufficient. To require more against such
an objector would require every one to prove a perfect
chain of title as against every stranger making any kind
of claim. This the law does not require. If the objector
has a better or stronger title than the prima facie title
proved, then he must show it, and until he does the prima
facie title prevails. (At 20.)
Severin did not produce an abstract of title at trial covering
the disputed property, but did show a prima facie title by
introducing into evidence a Special Warranty Deed dated July 30,
1976, in which Security Title Company, as trustee for Jensen,
conveyed to Dick I. Severin and Donna Severin, 56.01 acres, which
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deed was recorded

- CII ^

of * ,e Summit County Recorder

i

That jeuu..
title -

..,*c *i- . possession

- , ; o|~.*

*•: *. Severn^ wu_ Le_t-i±ed -~ ~^ h*.. i^~ ^ x w i ~o

w^-*1- Ar yc*r por-;M —

it Se:r.t:'\ ""I1:*-?

rieSiUt;..w **. charge oi cs^^^w ^iwoeauitro,
closi i- .

».
.
* ^tiiiJ ] V u a document * * , ,J- -; * ee.
admitted into evidence previously and *- Exn i r . t ~ . *i i :n
is a special warranty deed from Security Title to Richard
I. Sever in and Donna Severin. I hand you that document
and ask you if you are familiar with i t?
A. I am familiar with the form, but not specifically
this deed. We held title as trustee to this particular
tract of ground. It was signed by Craig Thompson, who is
still with our company. Well, in fact, he's manager of
the office now. Lucille Wright, who was secretary of *
corporation at the time. Conveys from us, Security Tit.
Trust Company to Richard I. Sever in. Donna Severin.
Q. Has Security Title ever prepared a policy of title
insurance or a title search on this property?
A. From looking at this deed, I would say it appears
that it has because the number on the top looks like
12051-2 is an identification number for our office in
Heber City.
Q. I hand you an exhibit marked 8-D and ask you if
you. can, identi fy that document.
A. This is a policy of title insurance that was
issued by our office in Heber City. It has been signed by
a Darwin McGuire, who is the manager of the office in
Heber City, and i t bears the same identification number as
this deed has on i t.
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Q. Does it bear the same legal description as the
deed.
A. Yes. I looked at this a few moments ago and it
does have the same legal description as the special
warranty deed. (R. 432-434.) (Emphasis added.)
Exhibit 8-D is a policy of title insurance, dated August 5 f
1976, and states that "The estate or interest referred to herein is
at Date of Policy vested in:

RICHARD I. SEVERIN and DONNA

SEVERIN, his wife, as joint tenants."
Exhibit 35-D was also introduced into evidence, being a
Special Warranty Deed from Security Title Company to Richard I.
Severin and Donna Severin, dated December 27, 1977, and recorded in
the office of the Summit County Recorder on December 30, 1977 at
Book M 107, Page 28, Entry No. 14301 (Deed No. 4, Chart A ) .
No evidence was introduced at trial, no question ever raised,
and no allegations by W. Brent Jensen or Appellant that Security
Title Company did not have possession, nor that they could not
convey title to said properties to Severin.
All the plaintiff need do was to prove prima facie that he had
a title which, if not overcome by defendant, would be sufficient.
See B^bccK^k^y^^Dan^rfieJLd, supra.

Severin1 s prima facie title was

put into evidence, and to overcome it, Woodard needed to show a
better or stronger title.

He did not do it.
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III.
RESPONSE TO WOODARD
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r e s p o n d e n t would like to hilefly
Ai " H ! ' \ I Ml J T f 1 I

Sever i ris hahl irtual

respond.

' n|ir I I a m i '

notice ot Woodar;"a

(Brief, p. 1 i >

Had Woodard

pi "['H » , , 1

,i

I T il it- In iiuik

believable,

Hut

he never had an agreement

been able to convince

t-ithrr

haa

agreement

I In

• agreement, L U £
w*i^, argument an« ...u.w. *~

fii.il

+

:o purchase. He has not
appcala I'mnl , I lim

lie lurid a land purchase a g r e e m e n t , su il .»eeins a Iittie speeiuti;. to
argue that Se^erin had notice ol
The statu! 1

it.

n t ma I mil i M I > ::'arl iinii ri7-'l h

Utah Cude

^ji£ta_te_d, winch provtciesi
• Every conveyance ot real e s t a t e , and every instrument of
writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real
estate or whereby any real estate may be a f f e c t e d , to
operate as notice to third p e r s o n s shall be proved or
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acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by
this title and recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county in which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto
without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or
record, and as to all other persons who have had actual
notice. (Emphasis added.)
The early case of Toljmd_y_._J2orej£,

6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190,

cited in appellant's brief, (p. 16, 17) fairly states the case law
regarding the above statute:
Our statute requires actual notice and constructive
notice is not sufficient. The demands of the statute are
answered if a party dealing with the land has information
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man upon
inquiry, and which would, if pursued, lead to actual
knowledge of the state of the title; and this is actual
notice.
There is no question that Severin was put on notice of some
kind that Woodard was claiming an interest in the property.

But

being put on notice that Woodard was claiming an interest does not
mean Woodard has superior title, putting an end to the matter.

As

is stated in the Toljmd case, notice is only a trigger to put a
prudent man on inquiry, "which would, if pursued, lead to actual
knowledge of the state of the title . . . "
So, what was the state of the title of which Severin had notice?
First, Woodard never claimed to have had title to the property
(R. 190, 193, 194, 315, 328); Jensen never claimed to have conveyed
title to Woodard (R. 400, 404, 405, 407, 408); and when Severin
inquired of them he was told Woodard was claiming an interest but
did not have title. (R. 464-66.)
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What mo r e d o e s a p :I : i i 3 e i I 1 m a i I :i o ?
As stated in Hottinger v._Jensen, 684 P. 2d, 1271 (Utah, 1984):
11 is a A e11-established principle o£ 1 aw that where
circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person
should make inquiries, the law charges the person with
notice of facts which a reasonable diligent inquiry would
have disclosed, (At 12,74)
Severi n meets that standard and is mote than willing, to arcept
:: f

k i I D * 1 e 3i \*

m I a c t .".- I l u i

inquiry would have d i s c l o s e d , "

.i

i i J . m i i t i 11 i

Those facts w e r e ;

11 i I i i|i i n

Woodard did not

have t i 11e t o t he pr o pe r ty.
RE^ irERS IBI .E ERROI :

Ap| »c 1 I ., 1 11 .J;.

that tl le trial court d i d not issue findings

t
z - ae*

m d evictions

of law relative to the mutual mistake ±u Luc xeyai description,

reformation and actual notice to the Severins.

But in factf the

Trial Court never had to get to those issues because the Court
determined that the 1972 Agreement was not a land purchase
agreement.

There was no sale—therefore, there was nothing to

reform, no mutual mistake to correct and certainly no actual notice
to the Severins of a document that did not exist.
Appellant is so focused on the fact that he was to get title
to the property, that he has failed to realize the consequence of
the Agreement not being a land sale agreement.

The Trial Court did

make a finding of fact that the 1972 Agreement contained an
erroneous legal description (R.222), but also found that the 1972
Agreement was "not a conveyance of title to the property." (R.222.)
Because the Agreement is not a land sale contract, the Court never
got to the issue of whether or not there had been a mutual mistake
and whether or not the Agreement should be reformed—because it was
immaterial.

CONCLUSION
As to the quiet title issue between Woodard and Severin,
Severin has placed before the Court a prima facie title.
has not, and cannot, produce a superior title.

Woodard

Rather, Woodard is

attempting to reform an Agreement to agree to give Woodard a first
right of refusal or option into a land purchase agreement.
Reforming the legal description does not transform the Agreement
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into a land purchase contract.

Further, the Agreement contained a

condition subsequent which never occurred.
The decision of the Third District Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals should be affirmedf quieting title to the Severins.
DATED this _ J ^ 2 _

da

¥

of

Februaryf 1988.
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APP_E_NDIX__A
A

__G_R__E_E__M_E_N__T

W. BRENT JENSEN, Seller and CECIL WOqDARD,__Buy_er
Se£tember_2_l_L_19J_2

CAIIIUI

A G R E E M E N T

Xhi* agreement a*4e and antarad Into tula 21at day of Septeaber, 1972,
ay and fcatvaaa V« BRENT JKNSKN, Uaralnaftar rafarrad to aa Seller and
CECIL WXMaUU), harainaftar rafarrad to aa buyar.

Nov, therefore, it la

keraby agreed between *the partlaa aa follow*:
1*

It la agreed that tae a all a r la deairoua of aalling and the buyar

la daalrou* *f buying a parcel of ground mora specifically described aa

« note

fV't*'"**

**' ***#<

« W / » r TS&iCft

ZZQft.S.

„*</•

f**h~> *.^-

?o<*, *7'ffi

"*«*

C«* f-a
*?

,uJ

<*B *W

* W <

S*/c

'^iki^iuL Vq& m*t& ^c.i% ua^d »**#&« s
2.

I t la undarataod that Lot No. 1 la in tha procaaa of being node

r*a4y for recording with Sussoit County, Utah and eanaot ba aold at thla tin*.
aVove*er, aallar agreea that when Lot No. 1 la recorded the buyar haa f i r s t
t i g h t and option to purohaae Lot No. 1.
3.

Qtttll that Claw buyer agree* go buy per* of Pereet Meadow Ranch

t l « t * £ Lot #69, aora e p e c i f i c a l l y eeecribed aa beginning at a point 1520 I t .
M, $12 f t . ft. from W.W. Cor. Sac. 27, TIN, RAK, 8LB4M and running thence:
s&i*fc'*2f 4*" I . 144.59 f t . | N * 3 # 43 , 44 w 1 . 1 183.10 f t . ; N. 09* 27' 44M W.,
60.a> f r . i «. 73 # 28* 27" K9 94.92 f t ; South 320 f t . , to point of beginning,
hereinafter referred to aa Lot No. 2.

At the t i o e Lot No. 1 la recorded

the buyer w i l l releaaa the right and intaraat In Lot No. 2, and w i l l exercise
hie option on Lot No. 1.
4.

TUe aallar ggraaa to provide culllnary water to Lot No. 1 through a

central water eye tea.
5.

The t e l l e r warrant! to the buyer that a properly l o e t a l l e d s e p t i c

tank aya tea w i l l meet a l l county and atata requirejianta for aewage diapoaal
and no accasament w i l l be made for a savage hook-u .
6.

Tones of the e a l e .

The buyer agraee to pay $7,000.00 in caah and

8,000 shares of Adak Energy Corporation stock harelnattar rafarrad to aa the
Stock.

The aallar acknowledges the stock la investment stock and at the

present tine i s not tradable.

The a a l l a r agraea that the a took w i l l ba

hold i n eecrov in the e e l l e r a a ana at the aaia office of Walker Bank 4 Truet,

B00KM56 PA3E389,
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Salt Ufc* City, Utah until aaid stock bacoms fraa trading.

Tha buyer

guarantaas to tha aaXlar that tha atock vill hava a aarkat value ot U par
share oo or bafora Octobar 1» 1974, sad that tha aallar vill ba sbla to
sail through a broker tha atock for $1 a share.

Tha buyer rataina an

optlam to purchase back tha said stock for $1 par share on or before October 1,
1974.
7.

tha aallar hereby agraaa to furnish to tha buyar Xitia I n s u r a n c e ^ ^ ^ ' *M

to tha property no later than Octobar 1, 1974

Seller -, \ f, \ /r/^f/^f
yfri-rt***
Jensen
W. Brant Jenajtn
Buyar
Cecil Woodard

•to # ono
•a*!**** a t g aaint *a*4*r 4*0 f t . an* £•»%, i t a tU

twmm tha S.V.

oaanar 99^0 26, t i n , A4£# 8L8e* and running hence H 61 • 30* i$ 670 f t . i
N U 9 01* l» 330 ft.$ S. 61* 20• U, 665 ft.I S 76° 30' £» 170 f t . I
8 4a* 40' £, 60 f t . . 1 Seuth, 60 f t . I S 16° 30* tt, 130 f t . ta tha point
•f toaglnnlng.

5.11.* < x V ASZ£*Cf
S,1S?'AZ*?<H
N. Br«nt <J«p**n

Buym.
C« " uoodard
toil
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were bona fide purchasers without notice and
without further duty to inquire. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the recording statutes and subvert the sound commercial policy they promote.
We reverse and remand with instructions to
quiet title to Dakal and/or Diversified, as
their interests may appear, as against American. Each party shall bear its own costs of
appeal.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. The reconveyance gives every appearance of being
the product of a deliberate—and deliberativeact. The 'Full Reconveyance* was signed by one
officer and attested by another. It recited that
written instructions to reconvey had been received
from the beneficiary and that the note secured by
the trust deed had been presented for endorsement.
It additionally recited that the reconveyance was
executed by authority of a resolution of American's
board of directors.
2. Significantly, the stipulated facts include nothing
inconsistent with the conclusion that the dealings of
Rydalch and Dakal, through the broker Pentelute,
were at arm's length.
3. For purposes of this appeal, we employ the
parties' logic that the legal effect of an improvidently recorded reconveyance is to leave the lien
created by the trust deed in legal existence, albeit
unrecorded. We are not asked to decide whether
reconveyance has the legal effect of actually terminating the lien created by a trust deed and rendering
the accompanying note, if it has not been repaid,
unsecured.
4. The previously identified specific factors relied on
by the court in support of its conclusion that Pentelute and Peck were not bona fide purchasers do not
tilt toward that result. Reference in Rydalch's deed
to American's interest was meaningless in the face
of American's subsequent reconveyance. A distress
sale well below market price can be prompted by
numerous factors. Indeed, it was stated in the stipulation of facts that Rydalch would testify he agreed
to sell so cheaply because he could not secure a loan
since the duplex was not owner-occupied and
because of the lis pendens against the property. In
addition, it was actually stipulated that Rydalch was
under extreme pressure because of Holzer's threats
of violence and because of the imminency of a
trustee's sale noticed by Holzer. A hefty finder's
fee is to be expected where a free-lance broker
finds a property which can be had for a comparative
song. A same-day transfer from one related entity
to another might be effected for a number of tax or
business reasons. In this case, Diversified was a
group of investors put together by Peck but who,
unlike Peck, apparently had no interest in Dakal.
The back-to-back sales left the Diversified shareholders with a property worth more than they had
to pay for it, while netting Dakal, in which Peck
apparently had a greater interest, $8,000.00 profit.
5. A duty of inquiry requires the party to make
inquiry and to diligently do that which the answer to
the inquiry reasonably prompts. Pentelute's inquiry
elicited an answer which was consistent with the
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reconveyance document he had seen, the title report,
and Rydalch's and Burnett's reports about what
they were told. It would stretch the notion of
inquiry notice beyond the breaking point to hold
that the answer Pentelute received to his inquiry of
American should have prompted him to go further.
What would he have done? Demand to see receipts,
instructions for reconveyance from the beneficiary
to the trustee, or the chairman of American's
board? He obviously had some concern or, with a
reconveyance regular on its face in hand, there
would be no reason to call American for verbal
confirmation of the fact of reconveyance. But a
duty to inquire is not a duty to disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set straight. See also Note 1,
supra.
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W. Brent Jensen, Pro Se.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Cecil Woodard appeals a trial court judgment quieting title in Richard and Donna
Severin to a five acre parcel of property. We
affirm.
In 1972, Woodard met with a developer, W.
Brent Jensen, to discuss the purchase by plaintiff of five acres of mountain property,
owned by Jensen, as a cabin site. They agreed
on a parcel and marked a corner with a pile of
rocks. On September 21, 1972, Woodard and
Jensen executed a written agreement, prepared
by them, which states in pertinent part:
This agreement made and entered
into this 21st day of September,
1972, by and between W. BRENT

For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult CodeftCo's Annotation Service
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62 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
JENSEN, hereinafter referred to as
Seller and CECIL WOODARD,
hereinafter referred to as buyer.
Now, therefore, it is hereby agreed
between the parties as follows:
1. It is agreed that the seller is
desirous of selling and the buyer is
desirous of buying a parcel of
ground more specifically described
as
[a metes and bounds legal description is written in by hand].
The seller also agrees that this
parcel of land will be a minimum of
5 acres.
2. It is understood that Lot No. 1 is
in the process of being made ready
for recording with Summit County,
Utah and cannot be sold at this
time. However, seller agrees that
when Lot No. 1 is recorded the
buyer has first right and option to
purchase Lot No. 1.
3. Until that time buyer agrees to
buy part of Forest Meadow Ranch
Plat C Lot #69, more specifically
described as
[legal description typed in]
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2.
At the time Lot No. 1 is recorded
the buyer will release the right and
interest in Lot No. 2, and will exercise his option on Lot No. 1.

Code • C o
Provo, Utah

| one time, Ricnard Severin asked Woodard
I why he was building on land he did not own.
Woodard told Severin he had an agreement
with Jensen to purchase the property. Jensen
conveyed additional property to the Severins
on November 22,1974.
On December 10, 1974, Woodard filed a
complaint against Jensen seeking specific
performance of the agreement and execution
of a warranty deed to the property described
in paragraph one and at the bottom of page
two. In his answer filed January 7, 1975,
Jensen admitted he sold to Woodard the
property in paragraph three and further gave
him a first right and option to purchase other
property when recorded. Woodard filed an
amended complaint adding an alternative
remedy of money damages in light of Jensen's
possible inability to fulfill the condition of
recording under the agreement.
On July 30, 1976, Jensen, through Security
Title Company, conveyed 56 acres to the
Severins by special warranty deed. This
acreage encompasses the prior two conveyances from Jensen to the Severins plus most of
the Vive acres claimed by Woodard. On December 27, 1977, Jensen again through Security
Title Company conveyed ten more acres to the
Severins which encompasses the remainder of
the property claimed by Woodard.
At a pre-trial conference between
Woodard and Jensen, the parties realized the
mutual mistake committed in the description
of the property. The trial court authorized
7. The Seller hereby agrees to
Jensen to file a third-party complaint against
furnish to buyer Title Insurance to
the Severins to rescind the five acre portion of
the property no later than October
the deed claimed by Woodard. Jensen filed his
1, 1974.
third-party complaint on July 6, 1979 which
The handwritten legal description in paragraph was later dismissed by the court.
one was entered by Jensen a day or two after
Woodard filed a second amended complaint
execution of the agreement. Approximately on April 11, 1980, increasing the requested
one week later, Jensen typed in a legal descr- damages. Then, on October 17, 1980, he filed
iption of the property at the end of the second a third amended complaint alleging for the
page of the agreement and the two men again first time mutual mistake in the original agrexecuted the agreement. Both descriptions eement. Woodard offered a substitute legal
erroneously described a five acre parcel south description of the property and requested
of the property Woodard selected which reformation and specific performance of the
Jensen did not even own.
agreement and an order requiring the Severins
Woodard paid Jensen $7,000.00 cash and to execute and deliver a quitclaim deed to the
delivered 6,000 shares of stock to him as a disputed five acres. In the alternative,
down payment on the property. Woodard also Woodard requested $63,500.00 in damages.
Trial was held July 8 and 9, 1982. The court
delivered to Jensen title to a truck as partial
payment and in exchange for Jensen's agree- found the 1972 agreement was not a conveyment to dig the footings and basement for the ance of title to the property and that the
cabin. In August, 1973, despite having no title Severins were, through a series of recorded
yet in the property, Woodard began constru- conveyances, the record title owners of the
ction of his cabin on the five acre parcel of disputed property. Woodard was held to have
no right, title, or interest in said property and
property he had selected.
Meanwhile, and also in August, 1973, was, therefore, estopped to claim specific
Jensen conveyed a 17.59 acre parcel, just performance of the agreement or a deed to the
south of Woodard's cabin, to Richard and property. As between Woodard and Jensen,
Donna Severin. The Severins also began con- the court ordered Jensen to pay him
struction of a cabin that month. The parties $25,300.00 in damages, the value of the promet occasionally and discussed their cabins. At perty with improvements ($28,500.00) less the
balance due on the agreed price ($3,200.00).
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code«Co's Annotation Service
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On appeal, Woodard argues the trial court the equitable remedies of reformation and
erred in ignoring in its findings, conclusions, specific performance of the agreement are not
and judgment the following determinative available to Woodard.
issues: reformation of the agreement, admitted
We therefore affirm the judgment.
mutual mistake, specific performance of the
Russell W. Bench, Judge
reformed agreement, possession of the land by
Woodard, and actual notice of the Severins. WE CONCUR:
R. W. Garff, Judge
He asks this Court to reverse the judgment
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
and remand with instructions to reform and
specifically enforce the agreement against the
Severins.
The equitable remedies of reformation and
specific performance are not available in the
Cite as
instant case. As Woodard and Jensen discu62 Utah Adv. Rep. 29
ssed the purchase and sale of the property,
Jensen informed him the contract he had with
IN THE
the original sellers prohibited conveyances of
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
less than ten acres unless the property was in a
recorded subdivision. The parties incorporated Ben K. HOOPIIAINA,
this condition into the agreement:
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
2. It is understood that Lot No. I is
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, dba,
in the process of being made ready
LDS Hospital, and Jane Doe,
for recording with Summit County,
Defendants and Respondents.
Utah and cannot be sold at this
time. However, seller agrees that when
Before Judges Greenwood, Garff and Billings.
Lot No. 1 is recorded
the
buyer has first right and option to
No. 860076-CA
purchase Lot No. 1.
FILED: July 27, 1987
3. Until that time buyer agrees to
buy part of Forest Meadow Ranch
THIRD DISTRICT
Plat C Lot #69, more specifically
Hon. Dean E. Conder
described as
ATTORNEYS:
[legal description typed in]
Matt Biljanic for Appellant.
hereinafter referred to as Lot No. 2.
At the time Lot No. 1 is recorded
Charles W. Dahlquist for Respondents.
the buyer will release the right and
interest in Lot No. 2, and will exeOPINION
rcise his option on Lot No. 1.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
(Emphasis added.)
However, subsequent to execution of the
Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing
agreement, Jensen discovered Summit County his medical malpractice action against Interhad changed its requirements for recording mountain Health Care, dba L.D.S. Hospital
recreational property. The new requirements, and granting defendant's motion for summary
as Jensen understood them, made it impossible judgment. We affirm.
for him to subdivide and record Woodard's
In January, 1981, plaintiff, while a patient
desired property.
at L.D.S. Hospital, was given a 200 mg. tablet
Both before and after October 1, 1974, the of quinidine, a drug which had been ordered
date by which Jensen was to furnish title ins- for another patient located in the same room
urance to Woodard, Jensen told Woodard that as plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that the drug
because he was unable to record the subdivi- caused injuries to his lungs and cardiovascular
sion, he could not convey the property. He system. On February 9, 1984, defendant filed
suggested various alternatives, all of which a motion for summary judgment based on
Woodard rejected.
plaintiffs failure to establish, through expert
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled where a testimony, that the quinidine caused his injucertain event or situation is essentially made a ries. Plaintiff admitted he did not have an
condition to an agreement, the absence of expert but asserted that he was attempting to
such event or situation precludes specific per- obtain one and would have one before trial.
formance of the agreement. BLT Inv. Co. v. Based on that representation, the court denied
Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978). In the the motion without prejudice. Defendant filed
instant case, recording was clearly a condition a certificate of readiness for trial on March 5,
precedent to Jensen's duty to offer a first 1984, and the trial was set for September 17,
right and option to purchase the property 1984. Plaintiff did not object to the certificaunder the agreement. As the condition prece- tion or the trial date. Defendant renewed his
dent of the agreement has not been fulfilled, motion for summary judgment in July, 1984,
For comoiete Utah Cnd* A

